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ABSTRACT
Gaming simulations are popular pedagogical devices, in part,
because of their ability to capture the dynamics of complex
realities. In particular, scoreable games have been used to
permit comparisons between teams of players and against minimum
acceptable "scores." One of the most sophisticated scoreable
games is the "Low-Level Radwaste Siting Game." Its creation was
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to assist in
the complicated task of siting low-level radioactive waste (LLW)
disposal facilities. This multi-party, multi-issue process is
very controversial. The game was designed to teach cooperative
problem-solving as a technique for managing conflict in
negotiating situations.
In December 1984, 34 people participated in the gaming
simulation at a DOE-sponsored workshop. A post-game
questionnaire was distributed to each participant. Its purpose
was to discover if participants had left the workshop with a
commitment to approach complex dispute situations, such as LLW
facility siting, in a cooperative manner and if they had, what
factors contributed to this. The findings indicate that more
than half of the participants left the workshop expecting to
behave in a cooperative manner when negotiating. Factors
contributing to this involved the personal goals of individuals.
The outcome of the game (e.g. whether or not a negotiated
agreement was reached), was not a factor. Participants who
responded that they expected to behave in a cooperative manner
were designated "learners." Learners distinquished themselves
from "non-learners" in many ways.
The thesis supervisor was Professor Lawrence E. Susskind.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 14, 1984 about forty people met at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts
to take part in a workshop on low-level radioactive waste (LLW)
facility siting. The purpose of the workshop, sponsored by the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), was to introduce participants to
theories and techniques of effective conflict management in hopes
that such exposure would influence their approaches to LLW
facility siting disputes. A negotiation simulation exercise or
"game" was to be the vehicle for interested parties to learn
about joint problem-solving techniques, experiment with these
techniques, and develop new strategies and behaviors for
productive interaction in complex dispute situations.
The DOE is the lead agency for national planning and
coordination of LLW management. One role of DOE's LLW
Management Program is to assist states in fulfilling their LLW
disposal and facility siting responsibilities. Toward this end,
in 1984, DOE approached the Program on Negotiation (1) at Harvard
Law School to create a simulation exercise specifically to help
identify "desireable patterns of interaction" between parties
involved in the LLW management process. DOE recognized that,
development of effective communication between
parties in conflict and the utilization of
techniques to manage and resolve conflicts
represent perhaps the most significant challenge
for the people involved in LLW disposal in the
next decade (DOE, 1984).
I wondered what impressions participants were left with at the
conclusion of the workshop. Did participants in the gaming
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simulation leave the session with a commitment to approach
complex dispute situations, such as negotiating LLW facility
siting, in a cooperative manner? For those that did, what
factors contributed to this?
I designed and distributed a questionnaire to workshop
participants in an effort to answer these questions. Responses
showed that more than half of the participants left the session
with a commitment to behave in a cooperative manner when
negotiating. The study reports and elaborates on these findings.
In conclusion, the study suggests three broad purposes that the
LLW simulations serve in preparing people to address
LLW facility siting issues.
Chapter 1
LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY AND POLITICS
There are currently three facilities nationwide that accept
low-level radioactive wastes (LLW) for disposal (2). These
facilities, located in Beatty, Nevada, Barnwell, South Carolina,
and Richland, Washington, must provide commercial LLW disposal
capacity for the entire country. They have been doing so since
1976.
In 1980, Congress passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act (94 STAT. 3347, P.L. 96-573-Dec. 22, 1980) which was
designed, in part, to relieve the unfair burden borne by these
three states. The Act mandated that each state accept
responsibility for the disposal of its own commercial LLW (3).
The Act also stated that LLW can be "most safely and efficiently
managed on a regional basis" and encouraged states to enter into
regional compacts as necessary to provide for LLW disposal. The
Act enables any Congressionally-ratified regional compact, as of
January 1, 1986, to refuse to accept LLW from states outside the
regional compact (4). The January 1986 deadline is now upon us
and a number of states are without access to one of the three
existing sites. Moreover, not one state or regional compact has
been successful in siting a new facility.
In 1962, Beatty, Nevada became the site of the nation's first
LLW facility. The site was licensed by the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) and operated by a private firm. Two more
commercial sites opened in 1963; one at Maxey Flats, Kentucky and
the other at West Valley, New York. Between 1965 and 1971, three
more facilities opened: Richland, Washington in 1965; Sheffield,
Illinois in 1967; and Barnwell, South Carolina in 1971. With six
licensed regional facilities, the needs of LLW generators were
being met and the responsibility for hosting sites was shared
regionally. By 1979, however, three of the six sites had closed
due to problems with the disposal method of shallow land burial.
Maintaining the integrity of LLW sites is essential, given the
goal of restricting releases of radioactivity to levels that do
not pose a threat to public health and safety. When the Nevada
site was established in 1962, comprehensive criteria for siting
and packaging LLW for disposal did not exist. Shallow land
burial for LLW was basically an adaptation of sanitary landfill
techniques. Unfortunately, what are now recognized as being
questionable siting and operational practices were factors in the
decisions to close the New York, Kentucky, and Illinois sites.
All three sites had serious water management problems. In
addition, by 1979, the Illinois site had exhausted its licensed
capacity.
The three remaining sites were not without their own problems.
During 1979, the governors of both Washington and Nevada ordered
their sites temporarily closed for periods of time. For
hospitals, research institutions, and some industries with
limited on-site storage space, this raised the prospect of
cutbacks on LLW-generating activities. (Nuclear power plants
were not as directly affected as they have larger on-site storage
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capabilities). Because the sites were only closed temporarily, a
crisis was averted. However, the Nevada site is now operating
under emergency regulations that require third-party inspections
of all generators shipping wastes to the site. Consequently,
costs of using the facility are high and its use is discouraged.
In 1983, Beatty received only 2 percent of the LLW commercially
disposed whereas Richland received 53 percent and Barnwell 45
percent (Spath, 1984).
In 1978, Governor Richard W. Riley ordered that the South
Carolina site reduce the amount of LLW accepted for burial. So,
South Carolina established a policy of limiting acceptance of
wastes at Barnwell to 2.4 million cubic feet per year. This was
followed in 1979 by an announcement that this limit would be
further reduced to 1.2 million cubic feet. The limitation was to
take place in phases and be completed over a two year period
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 1981).
The message was clear. As hosts of the only operating disposal
sites, the governors of these three states were not prepared to
bear the LLW disposal burden for the entire nation. As they
threatened to close their facilities to outsiders, state
authorities and the industry began to recognize the crisis
potential of disposal capacity shortages.
Representatives of the three states had additional concerns
regarding the absence of regulations and/or the lack of
enforcement of regulations to protect public health and safety.
This prompted the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
promulgate regulations in December 1982 entitled, "Licensing
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Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste." These are
codified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (Part
61). 10 CFR 61, as the regulations are referred to, represents
the nation's first comprehensive set of criteria for regulating
LLW disposal. 10 CFR 61 provides procedures, performance
objectives, and technical requirements for licensing land
disposal of LLW (5). With these regulations, requirements for
establishing and operating commercial LLW facilities are much
more stringent than they have been previously.
The U.S.Department Of Energy (DOE) and the NRC have produced
numerous documents to guide states through the siting process.
(The siting process is defined as the entire process from
determination of need for a site through site start-up). The DOE
is responsible for working with states to assist in the overall
planning necessary to provide state and regional solutions for
LLW disposal. The NRC is responsible for approving the license
for and regulating the operation of LLW facilities in "non-
agreement" states. "Agreement" states assume their own
regulatory authority over LLW but must first have received
approval by the NRC and passed state legislation enabling them to
do so. Of course, both "agreement' and "non-agreement' states
must abide by the NRC's baseline technical siting regulations as
set forth in 10 CFR 61.
While technical, economic, and policy-related details must be
tailored to the needs and situations of specific states and
regions, there are six generic phases in the siting effort (DOE,
1982 and NRC 1982). These will typically be carried out by
several entities including the state, a regional compact and
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private contractors. Federal agencies are available to provide
assistance and may be involved in regulatory activities if the
state is a "non-agreement" state. The six phases are summarized
below.
Assessment of Needs and Apr-gach: The state or region evaluates
the current and projected status of LLW generation; management
practices; legal, political, and regulatory considerations; and
future options. A decision is made to site a disposal facility
and a planning effort is undertaken to achieve that objective.
Site Screening: Site suitability criteria (pertaining to
demography, hydrology, geology, soils, land uses, cultural
resources, and other factors) must be met for a site to be
selected. If the state is an "agreement" state it may establish
its own criteria or regulations to supplement those of the NRC.
Criteria are used to screen for suitable areas within an
identified region, these areas are screened for potential viable
sites on a more detailed scale, and are screened once again to
yield candidate sites.
Site Selection: Candidate sites are identified based on the
screening criteria, preliminary data is collected, and technical
and economic evaluations are performed. Based on these
evaluations, a preferred site is chosen. Two or three viable
alternatives are also chosen.
Site Characterization: Technical, economic, and environmental
analyses are performed concerning the design, development,
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operation, and eventual closure of the site. These are necessary
to support a license application and verify that the site has
potential to operate in a safe and sound manner. The site
characterization phase will require a minimum of one year and
will likely extend much longer. Site characterization also
requires a significant expenditure of money.
Licensing Agtivities: The licensing agency, either federal or
state, reviews the license application, safety and environmental
reports, the general site design, and other information to ensure
compliance with applicable federal, state, and local regulations.
Site Developgment and Ogeration: If a license is granted, final
design and operating plans are developed, facility construction
and personnel training are completedand the site is prepared for
operation.
These generic phases are expected to overlap in time. Public
involvement and community relations activities should be an
integral part of the process and indeed, are crucial to its
success.
In an effort to comply with the 1980 Act, most states have
participated in regional compact discussions. To date, five
compacts (comprising 26 states) are awaiting Congressional
approval; three of these (Northwest, Southeast, and Rocky
Mountain) have one of the three operating LLW facilities within
their region. The other two compacts, Central and Central
Midwest states, have no facilities in their region. Texas is
the only state so far that has definitely committed itself to
e
working outside of a compact. It has established a LLW Disposal
Authority and is further along in the process than any other
state or regional compact. In late 1984, it identified candidate
sites as part of its site selection process.
Based on 1983 data, the member states in the three regions with
operating sites generated about 41 percent of the volume and 25
percent of the radioactivity of the nation'commercial LLW. With
the exception of South Carolina and Illinois, three of the
largest waste-generating states are not included in any of the
five compacts scheduled for Congressional ratification. These
are Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania. In addition, 24
states (generating about half of the volume and radioactivity of
the nation's LLW) are not expected to be ready to assume their
responsibilities under the 1980 Act on January 1, 1986 (Spath,
1984).
The reasons for failing to comply with the deadline are many
and reflect the complexities of the LLW facility siting issue.
First, governors and legislators are reluctant to deal with any
nuclear facility-related issue because of tremendous public
opposition. With the exception of the three states that want to
stop incoming LLW shipments, few states are anxious to address
the situation until it becomes absolutely necessary. For some,
the strategy of delay may make the most sense. Second, the
impetus for most states to participate in regional compacts has
been primarily defensive. By taking part in such planning, they
might possibly be able to encourage some other state in their
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compact to accept the facility thereby avoiding the
responsibility themselves.
Third, there are controversial issues yet unanswered which will
be difficult to deal with, even given the cooperation of all
concerned parties (which in reality is highly unlikely). In
addition to the question of which state in a compact will host
the facility, other problems include: a precise definition of
LLW has not been resolved to the satisfaction of all parties;
liability issues; and transportation issues (Spath, 1984). If
these problems are not enough, there are intrastate problems of
staggering proportion. These include: deciding the appropriate
roles of various government agencies; determining the process of
site selection; and making the choice of a specific technology.
Most importantly, states must deal with the potential political
impasse of public opposition to the siting of LLW facilities.
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Chapter 2
LOCAL OPPOSITION TO LOW-LEVEL RADWASTE FACILITY SITING
If one aspect of the current LLW situation is predictable it is
that there will be tremendous local, public opposition to the
siting of facilities in communities. Such opposition is similar
in most respects to that observed in the course of siting any
large-scale facility perceived to be undesireable, including
hazardous waste treatment facilities, power plants, airports, and
prisons.
Opposition arises from the fact that these facilities are
necessary and serve important regional functions but are
typically undesireable and noxious to the "hosting" and abutting
communities. Facility benefits are diffused across a wide region
and, for the most part, beneficiaries perceive that their rewards
are modest. Host and abutting communities, on the other hand,
have been asked to bear a burden for the entire region. They
acknowledge that such facilities are essential and should be
sited but just "not in their backyards." They feel unfairly
obligated to suffer the potential risks, costs, and lifestyle
disruptions associated with a facility. Their losses may appear
diminished when compared with overall regional gains; however,
concentrated local opposition is born out of self-interest and
concern for community. Because of modest rewards and
decentralization, beneficiaries are much less likely to coalesce
to support the facility.
Opponents of a proposed facility will tend to organize easily.
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They are neighbors. They see one another on a day-to-day' basis
and are involved in community activities. Most importantly, they
share a vision of community life that does not include the
facility and thus, they share the objective of stopping it. They
are determined and resourceful in acquiring the skills necessary
to participate in public siting activities. After all, they will
argue, the siting decision is the most significant control they
may have over this unwanted, potential neighbor.
Location of a facility is permanent. It will undoubtedly be
someone's neighbor and it does not appear to offer any
significant rewards. In fact, it seems to offer only risks and
problems (Elliott, 1984). It may increase public health and
safety risks, it may threaten sensitive environments and the
quality of natural resources, and it may alter lifestyles. While
the host community may realize new tax revenues, this will not be
the case for abutters who may also be impacted by the facility.
Monetary compensation is not likely to dispell opposition for
much that is threatened cannot be evaluated monetarily. It makes
sense that communities will oppose the facility. It is expected
to be an unwelcome neighbor and the potential gains do not
outweigh what are perceived to be direct and severe losses.
Opposition will also arise because LLW facilities often evoke
nuclear-specific images such as nuclear power plants, the Three
Mile Island incident, nuclear weaponry, and other perceptually
negative connotations. Because nuclear power plants produce LLW,
for many, accepting the siting of a LLW facility is synonymous
with condoning the use of nuclear power. This is in itself a
topic of considerable public and political debate.
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The traditional approach to facility siting serves only to
aggrevate local, public opposition (Bacow, 1983). It is
characterized by rigidity, suspicion, hostility, and lack of
communication by both proponents and opponents. The traditional
siting process begins with the proponent, either a government
agency or a private developer, determining a need for and
deciding to build a facility. This is typically done in
isolation, with only a small proportion of the public aware of
what is occurring. There has likely been little or no
interaction with potentially affected parties or local
governments. After conferring with appropriate technical and
political advisors, the proponent announces one of two things -
either that he intends to build a particular facility on a
specific spot or that the need for a facility necessitates some
sort of process whereby a site will be chosen (Susskind, 1985).
If a site-specific proposal is announced, the proponent might
also suggest that a few alternative sites be studied. To
opponents, these will appear to be contrived given the
proponent's likely strong support for the preferred site.
Community groups will organize and take action, legal and
otherwise, to stop the proposed facility (6). They will be
motivated not only by a desire to keep the facility "out of their
backyards" but also by what they perceive to be a disingenuous
proponent who has "sprung" this project on them at the last
minute. If a siting selection process is proposed, active
opposition may take a bit longer to coalesce. However, once
underway, the process will typically be managed by the proponent,
whom the potential host communities will perceive as being
biased.
As technical studies are performed and institutional and
regulatory affairs addressed, public information and
participation programs are initiated. Such efforts are too often
merely token or staged efforts at soliciting public input and can
be characterized as "too little and too late". At this point,
people who are concerned about the location of the proposed
facility and suspicious of the proponent's motives, will behave
defensively. They will reason that, at this stage in the
process, the proponent is unlikely to change his mind and choose
another site, alter his project, or become especially responsive
to public concerns. The realization will occur that the
opportunity to participate in formal public events is not the
same as the opportunity to share in the power of decisionmaking
(Susskind, 1985).
As the proponent has taken a strong position and is determined
to build the facility, so has the opposition decided that they
must be equally uncompromising in protecting their own interests.
Neither group understands the other's values nor shares their
expectations. Project proponents respond to what they perceive
to be local fears, by conducting technical studies in an attempt
to assure that health, safety, and other concerns will be met.
They are not convinced that their role demands more than this.
Residents feel that they have been mislead in the past by the
government and by technical studies. They do not trust any
outside party to protect their community as well as they can.
1 4
The process is fraught with conflict and characterized by
inflexibility. Both parties resort to "positional" behavior;
that is, behavior that is uncooperative and uncompromising.
Positional behavior is characterized by strict adherence to a
particular set of narrowly framed, preconceived notions about how
to accomplish specific goals. It is assumed that these are
mutually exclusive of the opponent's goals. Ultimately, the
dispute may end up in court, with long delays and high costs. No
one is likely to emerge feeling like a "winner".
An alternative to the traditional approach is needed which will
allow each party to achieve its goals while also meeting the
needs of the other parties. For example, such an approach should
enable a proponent to build a facility and meet its needs without
spending exorbitant amounts of time and money in legal battles.
It should also enable towns and local citizens to control their
own destiny instead of feeling "duped" by developers and the
government into hosting a facility. These "joint gains" cannot
be accomplished with the traditional "Decide-Announce-Defend"
approach (Ducsick, 1979). This approach, as described above,
unnecessarily results in a zero-sum situation.
A more successful process would involve collaborative problem-
solving, the focus of which is the definition and solution of
joint problems. Typically, this can be accomplished in a
negotiation situation whereby all interested and affected
parties, called stakeholders, are involved in working together to
discover solutions that are acceptable to all. (Since joint
problems are defined in terms of the interests of all parties, it
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is important that all key parties be represented in the negotiation.
This lessens the chance of "surprises" later in the process.)
Meeting this objective necessitates that parties look beyond
their own narrowly conceived interests and consider the concerns
of other, "opposing"., parties (Susskind, 1984). In so doing,
parties may discover that they have overlapping interests or that
one cares strongly about a point that the other has no strong
feelings about. This encourages trading between parties so that
each can meet their own interests.
There is no quarantee that this type of negotiation will lead
to solutions for all siting conflicts. But it will, at a minimum,
encourage stakeholders to interact with each other in a
productive rather than a confrontational manner, while
simultaneously fostering an environment in which each might meet
their own interests. A negotiated approach to joint problem-
solving can address many of the concerns and sources of conflict
that are either ignored or inadequately addressed by the
traditional siting process. Some of these are discussed below.
Information: A complaint frequently voiced by local groups is
that they do not have adequate information on certain topics.
Another complaint is that the available information is not
believable because it was compiled by the proponent. If original
analyses have been performed, it was likely by the proponent.
Some parties may feel that this results in biased information
upon which important decisions must be made. If parties can
negotiate an agreement regarding a joint fact-finding approach to
generating analyses, it will be easier for them to make and
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defend their decisions. Naturally, for the approach to be
successful, stakeholders must negotiate an agreement on the scope
and objectives of the studies, jointly select consultants to
perform the studies, and agree that the finished product meets
the desired objectives (Susskind, 1985).
Risk: Communities that host regional facilities perceive that
they are expected to shoulder a disproportionate share of
health and safety risks. They may also feel that the facility
and its attendant risks have been forced upon them with little
warning or sensitivity to community needs. Negotiations amongst
stakeholders may help reveal community concerns and means of
addressing them. For example, a potential host community for a
LLW facility may be concerned that volumes of incoming
radioactive materials will increase over time. It may be
necessary to initiate a LLW source reduction plan to address and
help assuage community concerns. A joint problem-solving process
which fosters communication amongst parties is conducive to
inventing options and discovering solutions such as these. This
type of concern might have presented itself as an impasse in the
traditional process.
Decisionmaking Responsibility: Too often communities feel that
they have been given only a token opportunity to participate or
that they have been altogether excluded from the decisionmaking
process. A negotiation may alleviate the sense of alienation and
illegitimacy that communities feel as a result of the traditional
process. Joint problem-solving helps to open up the process from
the outset.
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The need to be involved in decisionmaking extends beyond the
siting process and to the facility operations phase. A community
may be concerned that, once operating, the facility may not be
properly managed and maintained to protect against accidents and
unacceptable conditions. Stakeholders may find that addressing
this concern in a cooperative manner might result in a contract
of shared control and monitoring of the facility. This would
address a community need to exert control over its future.
Comgensation: Few communities will allow themselves to be
"bought" by a facility proponent and will staunchly resist if
approached. Moreover, many impacts and losses cannot be measured
monetarily. Rather than insult the integrity of a community by
offering monetary compensation for some impacts, a negotiated
compensation package might raise the possibility of compensatory
action in the form of in-kind payments such as creation of
parkland, relocation of sensitive habitats, and other specific
actions. Creative solutions are not as easily discovered when
parties are not communicating their needs to one another and when
they feel "stuck" in an inflexible and adversarial process.
13
Chapter 3
GAMING SIMULATIONS
History~ and Rationale of Gaming Simulations as Teaching Aids
One of the best ways to learn is by doing. Hence, it was
decided that a gaming simulation would be used to highlight the
sources of conflict inherent in LLW facility siting. A gaming
simulation could also serve the purpose of exposing participants
to the use of negotiated problem-solving as an approach toward
resolving these conflicts.
Without having been involved in a LLW facility siting dispute,
it might be difficult to imagine the various parties, what their
concerns might be, and how they might behave in an attempt to
meet their self-interests. Even if one knew this information for
some of the parties, it might be difficult to imagine how
competing and conflicting interests might be reconciled in an
attempt to reach a solution. And, even if one had been involved
in negotiations concerning LLW facility siting, one could always
learn more about reaching agreement efficiently
and effectively. Short of actually participating in a siting
process, simulating it in "game" form is beneficial. In fact, it
may be preferable to participate in a simulation before becoming
involved in the real thing.
Historically, games have been considered exercises for the
purpose of amusement or diversion. However, games such a
checkers and chess have their origins in war games developed
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thousands of years ago. In the late-eighteenth century, military
games were used to simulate real-world battle situations for
analysis. Since World War II., gaming simulation techniques have
become increasingly sophisticated and employed in military-
policymaking areas such as strategic planning and weapons
development. "Crisis" games have also been developed which
require roleplaying in a scenario of a hypothetical crisis
situation, usually in international relations.
In the mid-1950's, the American Management Association along
with IBM explored the use of gaming simulation for training
purposes in the business world. Since then, the popularity of
gaming for educational purposes has grown. Today, most business
schools use gaming simulations as teaching aids. In the 1960's,
gaming for social science purposes emerged. These included games
in the fields of hospital administration, community politics,
ecology, and numerous others (Duke, 1966). Currently,
gaming is employed in an increasingly large number of academic
and professional contexts to simulate real world situations.
The popularity of gaming simulation is explained by the ability
of games to provide a microcosm of a specific environment and
process of interaction. In this way, games serve as a vehicle
for providing a holistic image of processes that are not
effectively communicated by other means. Gaming encourages a
dynamic transmission of ideas and "emphasizes a heuristic
understanding of some complex reality" (Duke, 1974).
Simulations are essentially operating models of systems or
processes as opposed to static models (such as mathematical or
graphic models). A simulation enables one to see how a system
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exists in any given period of time and perhaps more importantly,
how it changes over time. Of necessity, a simulation simplifies
elements from a larger system to illustrate and represent views
of reality, including interrelationships between those elements.
Gaming is an experimental or training technique which may or may
not make use of a simulated environment. Games are typically
associated with the study of human behavior or the teaching of
skills (Shubik, 1964). The gaming simulations referred to here
are concerned with teaching individuals about negotiated problem-
solving.
The elements in the gaming simulation are patterned from a
real-world system. These elements include players' roles, goals,
activities, and constraints. Linkages amongst and consequences
of these elements are either wholly or partially dependent on the
players' decisions (Greenblat, 1975a). Inasmuch, games require
active participation on the part of players and players are
encouraged to learn as a result of their participation.
Greenblat (1975b) discusses several educational viewpoints which
support the use and value of simulation games as pedagogical
tools or devices. These include the views that minds are to be
developed rather than filled with information that may soon be
obsolete; that people learn, not because learning is a goal in
and of itself but, because they feel that their learning will
facilitate effective goal achievement; and that people learn
best by doing and hence, should interact with information in an
active rather than passive manner. Simulation games relate
directly to many of these notions.
21
Simulation games help people learn by provoking curiosity and
inquiry rather than by "feeding" information. Games are
appealing to people. They create engaging and innovative
environments in which to learn. By so doing, they promote
holistic ways of looking at events and processes, and provide an
opportunity for vicariously experiencing some of the elements of
those events and processes. Games require active participation.
This frees players from dependence on a "teacher." Players must
make decisions and face the consequences of those decisions on
their own. As in real life, decisions must sometimes be made
with less than adequate information and time constraints. The
consequences of not making a decision have as much of an effect
as any other decision. Experiencing this firsthand helps people
learn and retain information much more effectively than having a
teacher explain it in the abstract (Duke, 1964).
Another characteristic of a productive educational environment
that can be captured in a game is the ability to permit and
encourage exposure to various perspectives toward to the problem
at hand (Moore, 1969). This experience encourages people to
think about the viewpoints of others - their feasibility,
desireability, and other considerations.
A learner is more receptive to information if it addresses a
direct need and if it is communicated in a logical and coherently
structured manner. It is crucial that the learner be capable of
identifying or perceiving to identify with the context in which
the information is presented (Duke, 1974). This will enable him
or her to deduce or make inferences that seem appropriate, that
will feel comfortable, and that might be extrapolated to real
life. It will also enable players to draw on their own goals and
sources of motivation. Thus, an important feature in the success
of games as teaching devices is their basis in and adherence to
reality. If players feel they can relate their gaming activities
to reality then the credibility of the game will be enhanced and
the prospect that learning will occur is increased.
While offering an opportunity to interact with information in
an active rather than passive manner, games also provide a "safe"
environment for learning. They provide an opportunity to
practice real-life situations without having to pay real-life
consequences of actions. They also provide an opportunity to
experiment with new behaviors in a relatively risk-free setting,
safe from the worry that the outcome will affect life outside the
the game.
Scoreable Games and LLW Fac ility ging
The opportunity for learning from a simulation game continues
long after the gaming session is finished. It is hoped that
participants will reflect on their experiences and try to
integrate aspects of what they learned into their lives.
Debriefing sessions immediately after the gaming simulation are a
very important followup. They allow participants to discuss the
process and outcome of their game and share their experiences
with others. If a scoreable game is played, scores can be
compared amongst teams. This enables players to evaluate the
effectiveness of various tactics and strategies.
Simulation games can be either scoreable or non-scoreable.
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Both types are suited for pedagogical purposes; however,
scoreable games may offer many advantages over non-scoreable
games. Unlike non-scoreable games, scoreable games allow for
objective evaluations of outcomes. In debriefing sessions,
participants in non-scoreable games discuss their feelings about
the process and outcome of the games they played. Objective
comparisons between games, and even evaluations of individual
games, are difficult to achieve.
In a scoreable game, however, players are equipped with
information to help them evaluate the value of the agreement they
walked away with (or from). Along with their confidential
instructions, players in a scoreable game are given a
"scoresheet" designed specifically for their role. This explains
their interests and concerns on the subjects at hand. It
illustrates which issues are of greatest and least concern and
serves as a guideline throughout the game. While players are
forbidden from revealing the scores on their scoresheet to any
other player, they must strive to communicate them in a manner
that will be convincing to others.
Because parties will be guided by self-interest, whatever the
topic of the game, parties are typically given the goal of
reaching an outcome worth as many points as possible to them. A
party cannot agree to be part of an outcome if it does not meet
their individual minimum score or "reservation price." As
explained by Raiffa (1982),
Your reservation price - which is based on
the value you have placed on [no agreement] -
is the absolute minimum value that you
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(as the maximizer) would be willing to
settle for. Any lesser value would be
worse than the no-agreement state;
you would walk away from the bargaining
table rather than settle for a value less
than this minimum.
Having a reservation price allows players to compare their
results with the results of others. It also enables them to
compare their result to the highest score possible. This
information is important in helping players understand their
outcomes and how to improve them.
The LLW facility siting game designed for DOE is an example of
a scoreable game. In fact, it represents the most advanced
scoreable game designed. In this game, which is described in
detail in the following chapter, participants are given the task
of negotiating a specific task related to LLW facility siting.
The goal of each party is to reach a negotiated agreement that
meets their self-interests. The game is designed and the scoring
system is such that there are a limited number of agreements that
will satisfy the reservation prices of the necessary parties
required for an agreement to be considered acceptable. The
players must work hard to discover the limited number of possible
agreements. The purpose of designing the scoring system this way
is to teach the lesson that players will do better for themselves
if they work hard to help their opponents do better as well
(Susskind, 1985b). This lesson emphasizes the importance of
maximizing "joint gains", as will be necessary if LLW facilities
are to be successfully sited.
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Chapter 4
THE SIMULATION EXERCISES
The Game Design Process
The process of designing and pretesting the Radwaste Siting
Game took about five months, from August to December 1984.
Because the game is to be applicable for play in any state, all
characters and settings are fictitious, and the scenario is
hypothetical. The game was, however, designed to simulate what
an actual siting process would be like and the issues of concern
to those involved. The work was accomplished in several key
steps.
The goal of the first step was to produce a matrix summarizing
the interests and concerns of key stakeholders at various points
in the LLW facility siting process. This task required
identifying stakeholders and constructing the framework of a
siting process to account for institutional, regulatory,
technical, and public involvement activities. Matrix cells were
then filled with lists of the concerns, needs, and
responsibilities of the various stakeholders throughout the
siting process. The matrix included 10 generic groups of
stakeholders (e.g. environmentalists, state elected officials,
abutters, and others) and 14 generic siting steps.
The matrix took about a month to produce. Background research
involved personal and telephone interviews with individuals
actively involved in LLW facility siting, and familiarization
with DOE and NRC siting reports and regulations. Given that
states have different siting procedures, political situations,
and physical characteristics, and that the game was to be
suitable for play nationwide, the siting process outlined was
actually a composite of existing and proposed processes. The
objective was to ensure that all participants could realistically
identify with at least some part of the process as presented.
Two potential games seemed especially obvious from the matrix.
These were sketched into "stories" and expanded for further
applicability to a scoreable negotiation game. Again, the
stories were written to be hypothetical so as not to suggest that
the scenarios were based on the experiences of any particular
state. One game involved negotiation about site screening
criteria and the other involved negotiation over which of three
potential sites should be the actual LLW facility site. Our
research and experience indicated that these two multi-party,
multi-issue parts of the siting process would be most conducive
to negotiated problem-solving and a scoreable game.
With two acceptable story lines, work began to develop two
structured, scoreable games. This involved reducing the number
of parties from 10 to a more manageable 6; consolidating the
number and variety of issues that each party would be concerned
about so as not to overwhelm players with the amount of
information to be negotiated; player-specific points had to be
assigned to each issue negotiated, thresholds had to be
established to formalize each party's minimum requirements for
agreement, and scoresheets had to be produced; and finally, the
mechanics or formal rules for the negotiations had to be
developed.
Developing the games occurred in an iterative manner. Issues
and components were incorporated at certain junctures while
others were discarded where necessary. Numerous computer runs
were conducted to identify the possible combinations of
agreements that would be acceptable to various combinations of
parties. Players' points and reservation prices were altered
depending on the ease or difficulty with which an agreement could
be reached.
The games were pre-tested twice in an effort to solicit
comments on how realistic and useful they were. This was done
once in October in Boston and again in November at DOE in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee. People played the games whose "real life"
interests and vocations resembled those of the parties depicted
in the games. Their comments and impressions resulted in several
changes to "fine tune" the games. Another stakeholder was added
to represent interests that were thought to be missing,
instructions were clarified, points were modified, and background
information was added to explain the history of relationships
between the parties. These practice runs were crucial in
contributing to the internal consistency, realism, and overall
success of the final versions of the games.
A Descrigtion of the Simulation Games
The negotiation simulation exercises or "games" are exercises
in joint problem-solving. Teams of players, representing
different stakeholders in the LLW facility siting process, are
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assembled and left on their own with instructions to negotiate an
agreement with regard to a specific LLW facility siting task.
Depending on their interaction, some teams of players will be
successful in negotiating an agreement acceptable to most
involved parties, others will reach unanimous agreement, and
still others will be unable to negotiate an agreement at all.
The Radwaste Siting Game is composed of two distinct parts (7).
The first part, Game I, involves choosing site screening
criteria; that is, those criteria that will be used to "screen"
parts of a state or region to locate areas with characteristics
appropriate for a LLW facility. The task set forth in Game II is
to choose a site for a LLW facility from one of three previously
designated towns. The three towns, which differ in several
aspects, are presumably finalist towns that have satisfied the
state's special site screening criteria as developed in Game I.
Each game is designed to be played in a two to three hour period.
Of course, the playing time can be increased if desired.
One need not have played Game I to appreciate or play Game II,
or visa versa. The games are designed to be independent of each
other. However, they do complement one another and, when played
in order, allow players to simulate the site screening and
selection process that is expected to occur in LLW facility
siting.
Game I begins with a representative of a hypothetical State
Regulatory Agency (SRA) in a hypothetical state convening a
meeting of key stakeholders in the LLW site screening criteria
selection process. The SRA is the state agency responsible for
promulgating site selection criteria and enforcing compliance
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with state and federal regulations. The SRA is anxious that
siting criteria be decided as soon as possible.
Originally, the SRA planned to develop a set of 10 siting
criteria that would supplement those already embodied in federal
regulations (primarily 10 CFR 61). Given growing public concern
and fears that widespread opposition might delay the siting
process, the SRA now prefers not to decide these criteria
unilaterally. In an attempt to maximize public support for the
regulations it will ultimately promulgate, the SRA has agreed to
host a special meeting for all parties interested in the
regulations. The purpose of the meeting and the goal of Game I
is to generate a joint proposal of the 10 criteria that will be
used in evaluating potential LLW sites.
The SRA has promised the parties that if they can agree to a
set of 10 criteria (out of 21 possibilities), it will adopt all
10 of them. If, however, the parties fail to reach an agreement,
the SRA will take matters into its own hands. The SRA has not
indicated which criteria it will promulgate if it is forced to
act on its own. Each party would prefer to have the criteria it
cares most about adopted by the SRA and therefore each has some
incentive to negotiate.
The seven stakeholders with an interest in the siting criteria
are:
* Public Management Authority (PMA)
* Federated Indian Tribal Council (Council)
* Environmental Coalition (EC)
* Green Wave (GW)
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* State Association of Municipal and County Governments
(Munis)
* Association of Radwaste Generators (ARG)
* Governor's Blue-Ribbon Advisory Committee (Gov)
Each party is provided with confidential instructions and a
scoresheet designed specifically for their role. These explain
their interests and concerns on the subject of site screening
criteria and serve as guidelines throughout the game. A party's
confidential scoresheet illustrates which of the possible 21
criteria are of greatest and least concern to them. (Each of the
21 criteria are assigned a positive or negative numerical value).
The criteria are explained in some detail for the sake of
clarification and to explain technical details.
Each party's goal is to promote an agreement on a package of 10
criteria that is worth as many points as possible to them. No
party can agree to a package unless it meets their reservation
price. The parties have many conflicting as well as overlapping
opinions about the possible criteria. It is up to them to decide
how to proceed with the negotiation and how to organize the
limited time they have been given. Only the seven abovementioned
parties are present for the negotiation. The SRA has merely
convened the meeting. There is no designated chairperson or
meeting facilitator.
A proposal of ten criteria will be accepted only if at least 5
of the 7 parties support it. That is, it must meet or exceed the
reservation prices of at least 5 of the parties. In addition,
all proposals must specify only 10 of the 21 possible criteria -
no more and no fewer. The game is designed and the scoring
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system is such that there are a limited number of agreements
(packages of 10 criteria) that will satisfy the reservation
prices of at least 5 of the 7 parties. There are 51 solutions
involving 5 players, only 4 solutions involving 6 of the 7
players, and no agreements are possible involving all 7 players.
The players must work very hard to discover one of these 55
agreements out of thousands of possible, but unacceptable,
combinations.
The Radwaste Siting Game II begins with a representative of a
hypothetical state agency called the Public Management Authority
(PMA) convening a meeting to determine which one of three sites
will be selected to host the state's LLW facility. There are six
key parties that have expressed concerns about the three
candidate sites, including representatives of the three
communities in which the proposed sites are located.
The PMA is a newly created state agency given the
responsibility of managing the siting, construction, operation,
and decommissioning of an in-state disposal facility. Its goal
is to site a LLW facility within the time limit specified by law.
But it recognizes that the viability of a site is dependent on
appropriately addressing public and community concerns to diffuse
outright opposition. The PMA has the power to select a facility
site. It is concerned, however, that unilateral action will
alienate the various parties and thus increase the likelihood of
controversy and delays in the site development process. The PMA
is therefore hopeful that the parties will be able to select a
site through a consensual process.
If the parties reach agreement on one of the candidate sites,
the PMA will approve that site for the State's LLW facility. But
if the parties fail to each agreement, the PMA will quickly act
on its own and select a site.
The other parties concerned about the facility and included in
this siting negotiation include:
* Governor (Gov)
* Environmental Coalition (EC)
* Association of Radwaste Generators (ARG)
* Town of Alford (Site A)
* Town of Bellman (Site B)
* Town of Crandon (Site C)
The goal of the parties is to reach an agreement on a LLW
facility site. If an agreement cannot be reached, the Governor
has empowered the PMA to select one of the three sites on its
own. No one knows which site the PMA will choose; thus, there is
no guarantee that the site will be chosen with complete
sensitivity to the concerns of those potentially impacted.
Therefore each party has some incentive to negotiate.
The discussions may proceed in any direction proposed by the
parties. The PMA hopes that an agreement can be reached, thus
preventing a situation in which it would have to choose on its
own. But, the PMA will accept an agreement only if at least 5 of
the 6 parties will support it and only if the host community
agrees to accept the site. This local veto power is granted by
state statute, but remains effective only as long as the
negotiations continue. The PMA will not participate in the
negotiations.
Because of the conflicting interests and concerns of the
various parties and the predictable community aversion to hosting
a LLW facility, the game is designed so that a limited number and
combinations of agreements are acceptable. In fact, only 7
agreements are acceptable. Five of these are 5-way and only 2 are
6-way agreements. To arrive at an acceptable solution, players
must be effective communicators and creative problemsolvers. As
in Game I, each party is provided with confidential instructions,
reservation price, and scoresheet to guide them through the
negotiation. Unlike Game I, however, the parties are also given
conflicting technical information in the form of two
environmental assessments. It is explained that an environmental
assessment comparing the three proposed sites was prepared by the
state. It was subsequently criticized by the Environmental
Coalition (EC) as being biased. The EC then proceeded to do an
alternative analysis. Parties must grapple with the differences
between the two documents in an effort to determine what they
believe to be accurate assessments of impacts.
Another feature of Game II is that, 30 minutes into
negotiations, the player in the role of Governor is called aside
and instructed that specific compensation options (both economic
and noneconomic) may be offerred to the potential host town.
Each party then receives supplemental confidential instructions,
with revised scoresheets, regarding the new compensation options.
These include: monetary compensation from the state and/or LLW
generators; the opportunity to share in the control and
monitoring of the facility (including the ability to close it);
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and reduction of LLW at its source of generation (either with
"caps" or with fees). Options and sub-options are valued
differently by each party and negotiations revolve around the
acceptability of various "packages" of options.
Results of the Games
About forty people took part in the DOE-sponsored LLW Facility
Siting Simulation Workshop. The agenda for the participants in
the day-long workshop was to play the games, reflect on the
gaming experiences, and learn productive means of interacting in
a negotiation situation. Participants included citizen
activists, representatives of Federal and state agencies, private
consultants, LLW generators, environmentalists, and others. They
all shared a professional responsibility for and/or a personal
and civic interest in seeing LLW disposed of safely and
efficiently. Nearly all participants were from the Northeast
United States.
Participants were assigned roles to play during the simulation
and given general background information and role-specific
confidential instructions to read before beginning. No one who
played had previously played the game or read the associated
materials. For a list of participants, their affiliations, and
the roles they played, see Appendix A.
Four groups of 7 to 8 people were assembled to play Game I.
(Although there were only 7 roles, some teams had two people
sharing a role). More than two hours later, when the exercise
was over, two of the four teams reported that they had been
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successful in negotiating an agreement. The other two teams had
been unable to create a package of criteria to which enough
parties could agree. Table 1 summarizes the results of the Game
I negotiations, including which groups reached agreement, parties
to the agreement, and the final point totals for each party.
As explained above, each party had a reservation price (RP)
that had to be met before it could vote "Yes" on an agreement.
These reservation prices ( expressed in points), are identified
in the Table 1. For example, the person in the role of the
Public Management Authority (PMA) had an RP of 38, reflecting the
fact that only some screening criteria would be acceptable to the
PMA. The agreement proposed in Group 1 resulted in a point total
of 43 for the PMA representative; she could therefore vote in
favor of this proposal if she so desired. (She could also have
voted "No" in an effort to "hold out" for a higher score or
block an agreement in which she perceived that others would
receive unduly large gains). Many prior proposals may have been
brought to a vote where she could not have voted "Yes". In the
same group, only the representative from the Municipal and County
Governments (Munis) and the Governor's Advisory Committee (Gov)
had enough points to vote "Yes." With only three supporters out
of the required five, the negotiated package could not be
endorsed. Because there are a possible 55 solutions involving
either 5 or 6 parties, there are many combinations of criteria
that would have provided more than just these 3 parties with
their minimum reservation price. Therefore, Group I's inability
to reach an agreement indicates that they failed to discover
opportunities for joint gain through their negotiation process.
Table 1
RADWASTE SITING GAME I:
Agreement on
Package of 10
Criteria
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Final Vote and Point Total
PMA Council
(RP=38)* (RP=26)
EC GW Munis ARG Gov
(RP=78) (RP=180) (RP=67) (RP=8) (RP=63)
No Yes
43
Yes
39-
Yes
5 of 7 parties
No No
31
Yes
5 of 7 parties
Yes
42
No
12
Yes
40
Yes
42
Yes
29
No
75
No
70
Yes
80
Yes
102
No
150
No
150
No
160
Yes
210
Yes
70
Yes
68
Yes
68
Yes
No Yes
6
Yes
9
68
Yes
65
No Yes
2 70
No No
82 -15 40
* RP (Reservation Price) is the minimum score any player must achieve before endorsing an agreement.
The RP for one role cannot be measured against or related to that of another role. RP's are
assigned in players' confidential instructions.
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Group No.
1
2
3
4
Had they negotiated more successfully, most of the parties could
have achieved higher scores and met their reservation prices.
Because this was not the case, the State Regulatory Agency (SRA)
will choose 10 criteria unilaterally.
Group 2, on the other hand, was successful in getting 5 of the
7 parties to agree to a package of 10 criteria. The parties
were able to exceed their reservation prices (although not by
much) and voted "Yes". That a party's points are so close to
their reservation price is an indication of the concessions that
parties must make to accommodate others in the final agreement.
That is, there are no big "winners" in the traditional sense.
Everyone "wins" when an efficient and stable agreement is reached
and the broader the consensus, the more secure the agreement.
The agreement reached by Group 4 was also an acceptable one, even
though it excluded the Association of Radwaste Generators (ARG)
and the Governor's Advisory Committee (Gov). As promised, the
SRA will adopt the 10 site screening criteria that were agreed
to in this package.
Although many proposals were put forth during the two hour
negotiation, Group 3 was unable to reach an agreement. Table 1
shows each player's points on the last proposal put forth before
the negotiation ended. Four of the seven parties were able to
vote "Yes" but this was one short of the five needed for an
acceptable agreement. The SRA, therefore, will proceed to adopt
its own package of 10 criteria.
For Game II, four teams of 6 to 8 people (some roles were
doubled up) played for nearly three hours. The composition of
teams was different from Game I. Again, two of the four teams
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(not the same ones) reached agreement. Table 2 summarizes
results of the Game II negotiation.
In Game II, the negotiation focused on choosing one of three
sites (A, B, C) to host the LLW facility. The first two groups
were successful in agreeing on a site. This was an especially
difficult task given that the host town (A, B, C) had to grant
its approval for an agreement to be acceptable. The points were
structured so that this could not occur without significant
compensatory measures being offerred. Group 1 reached a
unanimous agreement; all participants in the negotiation agreed
that the LLW facility would be sited in Town A. All parties met
their reservation price. (A reservation price was only
applicable for a town if it had been proposed as the site for the
facility. For example, for the facility to be sited in Town A,
Town A had to meet a reservation price of 29. Neither Town B or
C had to worry about meeting a minimum requirement because it was
preferrable for a site other than their own to be selected as the
host site).
Group 2 also reached an agreement regarding location of the
facility. Town B and the other parties (with the exception of
ARG) agreed that the facility would be sited in Town B. Only
five of the six parties had to agree for the decision to be
acceptable. Groups 3 and 4 were unsuccessful in reaching an
agreement. The points, as listed in the table, represent each
party's points on the last package of options voted before the
negotiations came to a close. Both groups had secured the
agreement of the proposed host town but failed to produce a
Table 2
RADWASTE SITING GAME II: SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Final Vote and Point Total
Agreement on Facility Site
Yes
Unanimous
Yes
only ARG excluded
No
No
Gov EC
(RP=60)* (RP=75)
Yes
66
Yes
61(62)***
No
51
No
50(51) ***
ARG
(RP=60)
Yes Yes
77 60
Yes No
76 49
Yes No
77 36
Yes No
76 20
* RP (Reservation Price) is the minimum score any player must achieve before endorsing an agreement.
The RP for one role cannot be measured against or related to that of another role. RP's are
assigned in players' confidential instructions.
** The RP is not applicable because this town has not been proposed to host the site.
*** The two different point totals indicate that two different environmental assessments were performed.
The first number represents the point total based on the state's assessment, the second on the
environmental coalition's assessment. See discussion on page 34.
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Group No.
1
2
3
4
Site A
(RP=29)
Yes
31
Yes
**
Yes
40
Yes
**
Site B
(RP=29)
Yes
**
Yes
31
Yes
**
Yes
34
Site C
(RP=29)
Yes
**
Yes
**
Yes
**
Yes
**
package of options that could be agreed to by the Gov and the
ARG. As shown by the first two groups, agreements were possible
and more successful negotiations in Groups 3 and 4 would not have
left acceptable packages of options "on the table".
Time was alotted after each gaming session for "debriefing" the
participants. This allowed a sharing of experiences and
impressions with others. There was also a more formal lecture
designed to help participants relate information about
cooperative negotiation to the negotiations in which they had
just been involved. Scores of individual players and teams were
also discussed and compared. The goal was to draw out comments
from participants and translate them to lessons learned about
negotiation.
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Chapter 5
QUESTIONNAIRE: METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
I wondered what impressions participants were left with after
the Low-Level Waste Facility Siting Workshop. Had they learned a
more cooperative approach to negotiation? Could they imagine
using any of the techniques that had been discussed? Could they
relate their gaming experiences to real-life situations? What
aspects of the workshopif any, had contributed to communicating
the merits of collaborative problem-solving?
A large part of evaluating the utility of games involves
identifying the extent to which the experience is perceived by
participants to be useful. To this end, I designed and sent a
questionnaire to the 34 participants in the December workshop.
In an effort to ensure complete and decipherable responses, I
called nearly all of these people and recorded their responses to
both the open-ended and close-ended questions. This person-to-
person discussion not only jogged their memories but helped to
provide additional comments. (Five participants returned their
completed questionnaires; the rest were completed by telephone
interviews). A 100 percent response rate was achieved. A copy
of the "Low-Level Radwaste Simulation Game" questionnaire is
attached in Appendix B.
The questionnaire includes six different sets of questions
designed to provide information about the respondents' approach
to negotiation, their impressions of the dynamics between parties
during the simulation, their motivations for participating, and
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their perceptions regarding the effect that their gaming
experiences might have on their real-life behavior. Respondents
were also asked to indicate their prior exposure to collaborative
problem-solving techniques and simulation exercises.
The first part of the questionnaire included seven statements
about negotiation. Participants were asked to indicate whether
they Strongly Agreed, Somewhat Agreed, Somewhat Disagreed, or
Strongly Disagreed with the statements. Depending on the
responses, I categorized respondents as either Cooperative
Negotiators or not. The second part of the questionnaire
offered six statements designed to elicit information on whether
or not participants thought the games they had played (the
negotiations in which they were involved) were conducted in a
cooperative manner or not.
Participants were asked to identify which players had a
specific impact on the negotiations and to comment on the
consistency of behavior in the game with what they might have
expected in real-life. The fourth section tried to establish why
people had been interested in participating in the games and what
they had hoped to accomplish by playing. Then, participants were
asked for their overall impressions of the gaming sessions and
specifically, if they thought that their negotiating.behavior in
LLW facility siting might change as a result of the experience.
The questions in this section were the only open-ended ones in
the questionnaire. In my telephone conversations, I asked
respondents to elaborate on their initial responses to these
questions. I asked if they had learned anything valuable
43
about negotiation, and if and why they thought the experience was
worthwhile. The last section solicited personal information
about the respondent.
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Chapter 6
QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
The questionnaire was designed to provide data for help in
answering the following questions:
a. Did participants in the gaming simulation leave the workshop
with a commitment to approach complex dispute situations, such as
negotiating LLW facility siting, in a cooperative manner?
b. For participants that did leave with a commitment to approach
dispute situations in a cooperative manner, what factors
contributed to this?
I hypothesized that:
a. Some participants would leave the sessions expecting to
behave in a cooperative manner when negotiating.
b. Participants likely to be cooperative when negotiating would
be those who thought that their gaming behavior closely resembled
the behavior they would exhibit in a real negotiation.
c. Participants who said they would behave in a cooperative
negotiating manner were likely to have participated in a group
successful in reaching a negotiated agreement.
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Of the 34 participants in the gaming sessions, 26 played both
Games I and II and 6 others played only one of the two games. In
Game I, 16 people comprised the two groups (out of four) that
reached agreement. In Game II, 14 people were in the two groups
that reached agreement.
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Chapter 7
QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS
Part ici2ants as Learners
Of the 34 people who participated in the gaming sessions and
responded to the questionnaire, twenty reported that they left
the workshop feeling they had learned something about the value
of cooperation in negotiating situations. These people expected
that, in negotiations generally and LLW facility siting
specifically, they would use some of the techniques that had been
used in the game. These people were very enthusiastic and
excited about the gaming sessions. They all mentioned that they
had learned something about negotiations during the workshop.
They were anxious to test some of the approaches. In fact, some
already had. I call these people "learners" and discuss their
reactions in more detail below.
Of the 34 participants, 20 (59%) were learners and 6 (18%) were
non-learners. Eight (23%) were nondesignatable, mostly because
their answers to my questions were incomplete or ambiguous. My
learner/non-learner designation emerged after I analyzed the
responses to my question - " After having played the game, do you
think that your behavior in low-level radwaste facility siting
will change? If so, how? If not, why?" This question was one
of only a few which respondents were asked to discuss in depth,
both in the written questionnaire and in my follow-up telephone
conversations.
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Those who responded positively and said they expected that
their behavior would, or already had, change were designated
learners. Also designated as learners were those who remarked
that they would be more aware of others' concerns and generally
talked about the importance of approaching negotiation situations
in a cooperative manner. Non-learners were those participants who
said that their behavior would not change as a result of the
workshop and that the gaming sessions had not influenced their
attitudes toward negotiation. Some respondents were vague and
uncertain regarding what, if anything, they had gleaned from the
workshop. Others made comments that were not applicable to the
question. These last two were non-designatable.
Learners said that, as a result of the simulation exercises,
they would be guided by a "different conceptual framework" (18).
(To ensure the anonymity of the respondents, references are
attributable by Player Number only. These are listed in Appendix
A along with the players' affiliations and roles played).
Learners commented that an important element of this new
framework was acknowledging that other parties had legitimate
needs and that it was necessary to understand those needs to
achieve a positive negotiated outcome. As one learner exclaimed,
"I don't want one of these [facilities) in my town; let's face
it, no one does but I heard some very persuasive arguments for
it. I realized that you have to listen to other people's
opinions" (24). Learners appreciated the importance of
discovering the underlying interests of others and of revealing
their own. One learner commented that in future negotiations he
would be "far more open to hearing and responding to the
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perspectives of Epeople3 with interests other than my own" (16).
Another said that "talking more to explain the whys" (12) would
be a valuable approach to negotiation. Learners recognized that
honest and cooperative communication was key to understanding the
needs of others.
Learners commented that they "learned to listen more than
anything else" (30) and that "you really have to listen to
understand what's going on" (21). Indeed, learners were aware
that active listening was absolutely necessary to understanding
and then addressing the interests of others in a negotiation.
Learners indicated that they would not feel threatened or at a
disadvantage because they had attempted to accommodate other
parties or explained the reasons behind their own views.
Learners understood that doing so may be an effective way of
satisfying all parties. One learner said that, "I think my
behavior in negotiating in situations where a group consensus is
needed would change... I would be more conscious of the
possibility that meeting others' concerns may not always damage
my position" (31). The same learner reported that his behavior
had, in fact, changed in that he was "more aware of 'packaging'
options" in a way that enabled him to satisfy his needs "while
presenting an attractive settlement option" to his opponent.
In fact, having experienced firsthand the interdependencies of
parties in the gaming simulations, several learners realized that
the willingness and ability to pay attention to other parties may
be key to their own success at reaching or improving an
agreement. One learner remarked that, "You win more by listening
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to other peoples' thoughts and opinions" and by recognizing that
your opponents are "there for a reason" (30). Another concluded
that, as a result of the game, he would be "more sensitive of the
need to satisfy the 'other guy,'...because if something will not
satisfy him, then I'm out of an agreement" (2).
Most learners indicated that they had learned a lot about
collaborative problem-solving. For most, it was their first
experience with a simulation exercise and their first opportunity
to try out their ideas about negotiation. Many said that they
thought their negotiation skills had improved since the workshop
and that they were better negotiators as a result. One learner
(who had to leave early) said the experience was "well worth the
trip to Massachusetts for just a few hours" to learn about such a
"logical, common sense approach to negotiation" (5). For those
who were somewhat familiar with cooperative approaches to
negotiation, the workshop helped to reinforce the use of such
approaches. One learner said that the experience helped him to
"not fall back into positional bargaining" (28).
I have categorized more than half of the workshop participants
as learners. How is this group different from the other
participants? What contributed to the fact that they had learned
from the workshop experience and expected that their negotiating
behavior might change as a result? Some special traits of
learners emerged.
A. Learners, more than non-learners, saw themselves as
cooperative negotiators rather than as "hard" or positional
bargainers.
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B. The goals of learners were different from the goals of non-
learners. I found that most learners indicated that., in the
gaming simulations, they tried to behave as they would in a real
situation and to assess the results. In addition, learners said
they wanted to negotiate an agreement in the games they could
actually support in "real life."
C. Contrary to my hypothesis, there was no indication that being
part of a group that reached agreement in the games influenced
whether or not a player was a learner. Learners failed to
negotiate agreements as often as did non-learners.
A. Learners as CoogeAtive Negotiators
Successful negotiation processes, those that result in stable
efficient, and legitimate solutions, require cooperation (Fisher,
1983). The objective of negotiation is to discover solutions
that will be acceptable to all involved. Meeting this objective
requires participants to look beyond their own narrowly conceived
interests and consider the concerns of other, "opposing" parties
(Susskind, 1984).
The process of cooperative negotiation encourages that facts
and feelings be shared and accepted. Maintaining cordial working
relations with adversaries is paramount to the process of
cooperative negotiation (Fisher, 1983). Collaborative approaches
differ from "hard" or positional stategies characterized by
posturing, bluffing, and obscuring the merits of the other side's
arguements.
The first section of the questionnaire, entitled
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"Negotiation," was designed to determine whether or not a
respondent approached negotiation in a cooperative manner.
Statements could be answered with "Strongly Agree," "Somewhat
Agree," "Somewhat Disagree," "Strongly Disagree," or "Don't
Know." "Don't Know " responses were not considered.
To be designated a cooperative negotiator, a respondent had to
have at least 5 points. Responses to statements were assigned a
point value of "1" or "0" as indicated below:
Strongly
Agree
When I enter a negotia-
tion I try to take an
opening position that is
much greater than what I
know I will settle for.
By acknowledging my
adversary's concerns or
problems, I can usually
help us both do better.
I will agree to discuss
any set of alternatives
proposed by my adversary
even if I am not willing
to commit to them.
When I get my way it means
that my adversary has lost.
I usually find it advantag-
eous to complete one part of
a negotiation before going
on to the next.
Once I get what I want, I
am not interested in helping
my adversary further.
If I am opposed to a proposal
suggested by my adversary, I
almost always reveal the true
reasons for my opposition.
Somewhat
Agree
0
Somewhat
Disagree Strongly
Agree
1
1 0 -
10
0
.9
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
Don't
Know
In tabulating points, no distinction was made between the
qualifications of "Strongly" and "Somewhat" in both the "Agree"
and "Disagree" categories. A total of 7 points was possible.
One of the 5 points had to be a result of disagreeing with
Statement I - " When I enter a negotiation I try to take an
opening position that is much greater than what I know I will
settle for." In other words, a respondent who received 5 points
but did not disagree with the first statement could not be
designated a cooperative negotiator.
Statement I suggests one of the most traditional positional
negotiation tactics - bid high with a "bottom line" in mind,
concede reluctantly to let your opponent think that you are
making important sacrifices, and ultimately, "settle" for your
bottom line. This bargaining approach fosters adversarial
relationships and does nothing to build trust. It is clearly not
compatable with a cooperative negotiating style.
Of the 34 respondents, 11 were designated cooperative
negotiators based on their responses to Section I of the
questionnaire. Of these, eight (73%) were also designated
learners. One learner who agreed with Statement I.A and could
not be considered a cooperative negotiator, was quick to explain
that she was "trying to change that Ebehavior3 as a result of the
game" (5). Table 3 summarizes the negotiating style of
participants as indicated by their responses to Section I,
"Negotiation."
Of the 20 learners, more than half (60%) were not cooperative
negotiators. This is fewer than the 83% of non-learners and 75%
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Table 3
SUMMARY: THE NEGOTIATING STYLE OF PARTICIPANTS
Cooperative Negotiator
Learner
Non-Learner
Non-
Designatable
Total =
8 (40%)*
1 (17%)
2 (25%)
11
Non-Cooperative Negotiator Total
(number of participants)
12 (60%)
5 (83%)
6 (75%)
23
=20 (100%)
=6 (100%)
=8 (100%)
34
* 40% (8/20) of learners were cooperative negotiators.
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of non-designated participants who were not cooperative
negotiators. Moreover, the percentage of cooperative negotiators
amongst learners (40%) is higher than amongst non-learners (17%)
and those who were non-designated (25%).
While cooperative negotiators represent only about one-third of
the 34 participants, it is significant that cooperative
negotiators were mostly (73%) learners. Being a cooperative or
non-cooperative negotiator does not necessarily predispose a
participant toward being a learner or non-learner. The higher
percentage of cooperative negotiators who were learners does,
however, suggest that it is more difficult to be a cooperative
negotiator and non-learner.
A recent large-scale study of the negotiating patterns of
practicing attorneys identified two basic patterns describing how
lawyers negotiate - cooperative and competitive (Williams, 1983).
When correlated with effectiveness in negotiations, it was found
that the highest proportion of lawyers with the cooperative style
were effective negotiators. Fewer "cooperatives" were average
negotiators and still fewer were ineffective. The smallest
percentage of those with competitive styles were effective
negotiators, the next highest were ineffective, and the highest
percentage of "competitives" were average negotiators.
The study reported that elements of the cooperative strategy
include moving psychologically toward the opponent and trying to
seek common ground by communicating a sense of shared interests,
values, and attitudes. Cooperatives tend to use rational and
logical persuasion to achieve cooperation, the explicit goal
being to reach fair resolution of the conflict based on an
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objective analysis. Also important to the cooperative/effective
type was maintaining or establishing good personal relationships
with opponents. These elements reflect many of the
characteristics of cooperative negotiators as discussed in the
beginning of this section and measured by the questionnaire.
Williams reports that cooperative strategies may be more
effective than competitive or "tough" strategies because they
tend to produce more favorable outcomes and result in fewer
ultimate breakdowns in negotiations. While it cannot now be
known how "effective" workshop learners will be in future
negotiations, it might be expected that those with cooperative
negotiating styles will continue to adopt that approach with the
result being favorable outcomes.
B. The Goals of Learners
The fourth section of the questionnaire, entitled
"Participation," sought to establish why people participated in
the workshop. Question V.B asked respondents to indicate what
they hoped to accomplish by playing the games. They were
instructed to check as many statements as applied. Figure 1
shows the tally of the responses. The most frequently chosen
statement was that which pertained to learning about negotiation.
Twenty-three (68%) of the 34 participants indicated that this was
one of their goals. Fifteen (14%) of the respondents seemed
intent on behaving as they would in a real negotiation. The same
number were interested in understanding the interests and
opinions of others. Next, 11 (32%) of the 34 indicated that they
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Figure 1
TALLY OF PARTICIPANTS' RESPONSES REGARDING
THEIR GOALS IN PLAYING THE NEGOTIATION SIMULATION GAME
15 Behave like I would in a real negotiation and see the results
15 Understand the interests and opinions of others, hear why
they believe as they do
11 Test out different behaviors from those I would typically
assume in a negotiation
23 Learn about negotiation
1 Reach an agreement at any cost
11 Reach an agreement that I could support in real life
5 Make a statement about my beliefs on the issues
9 Other (please specify):
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wanted to both reach an agreement they could support in real
life, and test out different behaviors from those they would
typically assume in a negotiation. Participants were less
interested in reaching an agreement at any cost and making a
statement about their beliefs on the issues. Other goals
mentioned included learning effective coalition techniques and
evaluating the usefulness of simulation games as teaching tools.
Table 4 disaggregates the information and presents it for the
three categories of learners, non-learners, and non-designated.
The goal most fre.quently referred to by learners was that they
wanted to learn about negotiation. Seventy-five percent of
learners responded this way, as did 75% of non-designated
participants. A much lower proportion of non-learners (33%)
indicated that their goal was to learn about negotiation.
Another goal of importance to both learners and non-designated
participants, 55% and 50% respectively, was that of understanding
the interests and opinions of others. Non-learners indicated
that this was not an important goal.
Twelve of the twenty learners (60%) responded that one of their
goals was to behave as they would in a real negotiation and see
the results. This was the second most important goal mentioned
by learners. Other participants mentioned this proportionately
fewer times - 25% and 17% for non-designatables and non-learners,
respectively.
Learners who set out to behave as they would in a real
negotiation did so primarily for pragmatic reasons. They wanted
to help ensure that they would be able to relate what they were
learning to their real life negotiating behavior. A logical way
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Table 4
SUMMARY OF PARTICIPANTS' STATEMENTS OF GOALS
Statement
Behave like I would in a
real negotiation and see
the results.
Understand the interests
and opinions of others.
Test out different behaviors
from those I would typically
assume.
Learn about negotiation.
Reach an agreement at any cost.
Reach an agreement that I could
support in real-life.
Make a statment about my beliefs
on the issues.
Other (please specify):
Learners*
12 (60%)**
11 (55%)
8 (40%)
15 (75%)
0
9 (45%)
3 (15%)
2 (10%)
Non-Learners*
1 (17%)
0
2 (33%)
2 (33%)
1 (17%)
0
0
4 (67%)
Non-
Designatable*
2 (.25%)
4 (50%)
1 (13%)
6 (75%)
0
2 (25%)
2 (25%)
3 (38%)
* 20 participants were learners; 6 participants were non-learners; and 8
participants were non-designatable.
** 60% (12/20) of learners indicated that this was one of the goals they hoped
to accomplish by playing.
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Total
= 15
- 15
= 11
= 23
- 1
- 11
= 5
- 9
to do so was to behave as they normally would and see the
results. One learner, who had read formal theories of
negotiation, related that she always wondered if she could apply
all that "academic stuff" to real life. Because the simulation
"helps get at real life," she used it as an opportunity to test
herself. To do so she needed to use her real life behavior. As
she said, "You may think you know what you need to do Cin a
negotiation] but until you do it, who knows?" (27). Another
learner said that he looked at the workshop as "more than just an
academic exercise" and that he behaved as he normally would in an
effort to diagnose his skills and identify his weaknesses as a
negotiator. He wanted to be able to "relate the experience to
real life so as to be able to critique Chimself]" (1). One
learner explained that she saw the experience as a "chance to
practice, a chance to reflect on real life, and extrapolate to
make it relevant to your life" (21).
Another goal important to a large number (45%) of learners was
that of reaching an agreement they could support in real life.
Only 25% of non-designatable participants answered that this was
important and no non-learners had this as a goal. This was a
goal for learners for many of the same reasons as explained
above. Reaching an agreement they could support in real life
enabled learners to further relate their workshop experience to
their real life professional situations which demanded negotiation
skills. One learner said that trying to reach an agreement she
could support in real life was "good practice" for her real life
work in which she would be negotiating agreements relating to
LLW. She said that she "hoped to learn things [she] could apply
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to Eher3 work" (5). One learner likened the experience to "final
training before becoming part of a successful real life
negotiation" (16). In this context, reaching an agreement that
could be supported in real life is very important.
Some learners (40%) also indicated that they wanted to test out
behaviors different from those they would typically assume in a
negotiation. Thirty-three percent of non-learners indicated that
this was their goal, as did 13% of non-designated participants.
Half of the learners who mentioned this goal were those who also
said they wanted to behave like they would in a real negotiation.
These seemingly contradictory goals are explained by two factors:
the participant was assigned to a role very different from what
they could identify with in real life and/or the participant's
role-specific instructions required behavior very different from
what they would typically exhibit. One participant who mentioned
both goals played the role of an environmentalist in Game I and
a LLW generator (ARG) in Game II. She had a difficult time
relating to the ARG role but she reported that once she began
playing "being in the opposite role made Cher3 a good negotiator"
because she was "much more tuned into differences" (21).
Overall, learners distinquished themselves by expressing the
following goals:
* Learn about negotiation (75%)
* Behave like I would in a real negotiation and see the
results (60%)
* Understand the interests and opinions of others (55%)
* Reach an agreement that I could support in real life (45%)
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* Test out different behaviors from those I would typically
assume (40%)
C. Learners and Success in Neotiating 8igeements
I hypothesized that participants who perceived that they had
"learned" something would be members of groups successful in
reaching a negotiated agreement in the simulations. This was not
the case. Table 5 presents information regarding the outcome of
negotiations. The information is disaggregated according to the
categories of learners, non-learners, and non-designated.
There is no pattern to suggest that learners were influenced by
whether or not their group reached agreement. In Game I, 55% of
the learners were in groups that reached agreement and 40% of
learners were in groups that did not reach agreement. For non-
learners, the percentages were 50% and 50%, respectively. For
non-designated, the percentages were 25% and 38%, respectively.
In Game II, 40% of learners reached agreement while 45% did
not. For non-learners, the percentages were 50% and 17%,
respectively. For non-designated, the percentages were 63% and
50%, respectively.
Many learners were in groups that did not reach agreement.
This did not seem to detract from their learning experience.
These learners frequently mentioned that they would have reached
agreement if given more time. One learner said that while his
group "did not reach an agreement" they were "extremely close"
and that "more time would have helped" (26). This suggests that
he was pleased with the direction the negotiation was taking.
Even learners in groups that did reach agreement said that more
Table 5
SUMMARY: PARTICIPANTS AND THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS
Game I
Agreement No Agreement
(number of participants)
Learners 11 (55%)*
(20 participants)
Non-Learners 3 (50%)
8 (40%)
3 (50%)
(6 participants)
Non-
Designatable
2 (25%) 5 (38%)
(8 participants)
Game II
Agreement No Agreement
(number of participants)
8 (40%)
3 (50%)
3 (63%)
9 (45%)
1 (17%)
4 (50%)
* 55% (11/20) of learners were members of groups that reached agreement in Game I.
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time would have been useful for reaching better or more inclusive
agreements. One learner said that, "with more time we could have
explored the concerns of all players" (24). Again, this suggests
that the negotiation was going fine but could have progressed
further if not for time constraints. It seems that, while
actually reaching an agreement was an accomplishment, its
importance was superceded by the process of the negotiation.
Chapter 8
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
At the outset of this study I posed several questions:
a. Did participants in the gaming simulation leave the workshop
with a commitment to approach complex dispute situations, such as
negotiating LLW facility siting, in a cooperative manner?
b. For participants that did leave with a commitment to approach
dispute situations in a cooperative manner, what factors
contributed to this?
I hypothesized that:
a. Some participants would leave the workshop expecting to
behave in a cooperative manner when negotiating.
b. Participants likely to be cooperative when negotiating would
be those who thought that their gaming behavior closely resembled
the behavior they would exhibit in a real negotiation.
c. Participants who said they would behave in a cooperative
negotiating manner were likely to have participated in a group
successful in reaching a negotiated agreement.
The questionnaire I distributed to workshop participants helped
me answer these questions and test my hypotheses.
I found that 59". of the workshop participants left the sessions
expecting to behave in a cooperative manner when negotiating.
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This answers one of my questions and supports one of my
hypotheses. Some of these people, undoubtedly, came with
experience as cooperative negotiators or a special predisposition
toward negotiating cooperatively. The games helped confirm to
these people what they already knew and believed about
negotiation. But, others had their thinking shaped by
experiencing the negotiation game. The game taught these people
about negotiation and they were receptive to the techniques
suggested.
I discovered that there were several factors which contributed
to peoples' commitment to approach dispute situations in a
cooperative manner. Personal goals were the most important of
these factors. Players who participated with the goals of
learning about negotiation, acting as they would in a real
negotiation, understanding the interests and opinions of others,
and reaching an agreement that they could support in real life
tended to be those who expected to negotiate cooperatively in
future dispute situations.
I hypothesized that participants likely to be cooperative when
negotiating would be those who thought that their gaming behavior
closely resembled the behavior they would exhibit in a real
negotiation. I found that, of those likely to be cooperative
negotiators, 60-4 responded that one of their goals was to behave
as they would in a real negotiation and see the results. This
supports my hypothesis. The participants that responded this way
purposely set out to use their real life negotiating behavior
during the games.
I also hypothesized that participants who said they would
behave in a cooperative negotiating mannner were likely to have
participated in a group successful in reaching a negotiated
agreement. There is no evidence to suggest that this was the
case. My hypothesis was not supported by the evidence.
All of the twenty people who left the workshop expecting to
behave in a cooperative manner when negotiating reported that
they had learned something about the value of cooperation in
negotiating situations. These people were anxious to test some
of these approaches in real life. I called these people
"learners". (Eighteen percent of the participants were "non-
learners" and 23% were non-designatable.)
Learners possessed some special traits. Learners, more so than
the other participants, saw themselves as cooperative
negotiators. They did not assume traditional, positional and
aggressive negotiation tactics.
Learners further distinquished themselves by the goals they
reported they hoped to accomplish by participating in the
workshop. A greater proportion of learners (60%), as compared
with non-learners (17%) or undesignated participants (25%),
reported that a goal was to behave as they would in a real
negotiation and see the results. Learners reported this was an
important goal because it would facilitate their ability to
relate what they were learning to real life situations. They
used the opportunity to diagnose their negotiating skills.
Forty-five percent of learners also reported that it was
important for them to reach an agreement they could support in
real life. This is compared with 25% of non-designated
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participants and none of the non-learners. Learners reported
that they wanted to be able to further relate their gaming
experience to their professional situations.
Learners, and a nearly equal proportion of non-designated
participants, wanted to learn about negotiation as well as
understand the interests and opinions of others. These goals
were not priorities for non-learners. Overall, it was important
for learners to relate their workshop experiences with real life
situations. While this does not necessarily sufficiently explain
why learners learned, it does suggest the educational importance
of simulating reality.
I also hypothesized that participants who said they would
behave in a cooperative negotiating manner were likely to have
participated in a group successful in reaching a negotiated
agreement. This was not the case. There is no pattern to
suggest that those who reached agreement were more likely to be
learners than non-learners. Reaching agreement was clearly
secondary to the process of learning about negotiation and
participating in such a way as to make the experience relative to
real life.
68
Chapter 9
CONCLUSIONS
The U.S. Department of Energy commissioned the creation of a
simulation game to help those involved in LLW facility siting
better manage that process. What have we learned about the use
of simulation games for the purpose of preparing people to
address LLW facility siting issues?
From the findings and experiences reported above, it appears
that the simulation games serve three broad purposes:
1. The simulation games act as a vehicle for bringing people
together to help resolve their conflicts by trying to accomplish
a specific task in a simulated environment.
2. The simulation games communicate lessons about negotiation to
participants.
3. The simulation games capture the dynamics and sources of
conflict in the LLW facility siting process.
The simulation games bring parties together in an effort to
help them resolve their conflicts and work together toward
finding solutions to LLW facility siting issues. The creation of
a hypothetical, simulated environment lowers the stakes and
encourages a quality of communication that might not otherwise
exist amongst the parties. At the same time, because it is
modeled after reality, participants can relate their experiences
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to an environment outside of the simulation. When the
participants are representative of the groups that will be
negotiating LLW issues in the real world, the situation becomes
an even more valuable simulation of reality. The opportunity to
interact in a non-threatening environment encourages parties to
work together productively.
The simulation games and accompanying debriefings communicate
lessons about negotiation. Participants are encouraged to
experiment with different approaches to negotiation as
suggested by the lessons. The negotiations required in the
simulation games also help participants diagnose their
negotiation skills to identify strengths and weaknesses. The
debriefing sessions introduce participants to the notion of
maximizing joint gains and suggest that these types of solutions
will be discovered with a cooperative, as opposed to positional,
approach to negotiation.
The simulation games capture the dynamics and sources of
conflict in the LLW facility siting process. For those with
little previous exposure, the games serve as an introduction to
the issues, the parties, and the politics involved in LLW facility
siting. For these people and others with prior exposure to
and involvement with LLW issues, the games simulate the
experience of siting a LLW facility. It is hoped that
participants will reflect on the dynamics and the process of the
negotiation exercise itself in their efforts to learn about and
practice methods of effective interaction.
70
ENDNOTES
1. The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School is an inter-
university consortium to improve the theory and practice of
negotiation and conflict resolution. One way in which it does so
is by designing and conducting negotiation simulation exercises.
2. Low-level radioactive waste (LLW) is material that has become
contaminated with radioactive elements. For the most part, these
are very ordinary materials such a protective clothing, paper,
cleaning equipment and materials, and discarded tools and
equipment that have become contaminated during the
application of nuclear technologies. Other LLW include those
produced or generated by:
* commercial nuclear power reactors: filters, reactor components;
* hospitals and research institutions: animal carcasses used in
experiments, lab equipment, and organic liquids; and
* industry: plastics and organic solvents that are waste products
from the manufacturing of radiopharmaceuticals, smoke alarms,
watch dials, and other products.
Most LLW is hazardous for about 300 years. (This is in
contrast to the tens of thousands of years for other types of
radioactive wastes). Most of the radionuclides in LLW have a
radioactive halflife measured in either days or hours.
3. Commercial LLW is that generated in the course of commercial
activities. It does not include LLW from Federal atomic energy
defense activities such as naval reactors development and
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propulsion, weapons activities, and defense materials production.
It also excludes Federal research and development activities.
4. Federal atomic energy defense and research and development
activities are excluded from the Act or any actions taken by
regional compacts.
5. From the 1940's to the early 1960's, the most frequently used
LLW disposal method was ocean dumping. Wastes were packaged in
steel drums, weighted with concrete, and dumped in water at least
6, 0 0 0 feet deep. Ocean dumping was expensive compared to shallow
land burial, and by 1962, 95 percent of all U.S. LLW was being
disposed of by shallow land burial. By 1970, all ocean dumping had
stopped. A defacto moratorium was enacted into law in 1983.
The NRC is currently considering the need for technical
criteria applicable to other land disposal technologies, such as
aboveground engineered facilities.
6. Some communities have been successful in instituting outright
bans on the siting of LLW or other undesireable facilities within
their boundaries. Others have discouraged siting by instituting
strict and very specific land use regulations. At least one
state (Massachusetts) has been successful in a binding voter
referendum (now Chapter 503, Massachusetts State Law) requiring
statewide voter approval before any proposed nuclear power plant
or LLW disposal or storage facility shall be constructed or
operated. The same Act prohibits the state from entering into a
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LLW regional compact without the approval of a majority of voters
in a statewide general election.
7. The Radwaste Siting Games I and II were prepared for the Public
Disputes Program of the Program on Negotiation by Wendy Rundle,
Douglas Rae, and Tod Loofbourrow under the direction of Professor
Lawrence Susskind and Denise Madigan. Copies of this case are
available through the Case Clearinghouse of the Program on
Negotiation at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
Player No. Affiliation (State)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
* Abbreviations:
Game I
PMA = Public Management Authority
Council = Federated Indian Tribal Council
EC = Environmental Coalition
GW = Green Wave
Munis = State Association of Municipal and
County Governments
ARG = Association of Radwaste Generators
Gov = Governor's Blue Ribbon Advisory CommitteE
- = did not play
Game II
Gov = Governor
EC = Environmental Coalition
ARG = Association of Radwaste Generators
Site A = Town of Alford
Site B = Town of Bellman
Site C = Town of Crandon
- = did not play
Sex Roles*
State Agency (MA)
Federal Agency (MA)
Academic Institution (NY)
Private Firm (MA)
Environmentalist (NY)
Federal Agency (MA)
State Agency (MA)
Academic Institution (MA)
Citizen Activist (NH)
Private Consultant (MA)
LLW Generator (MA)
State Agency (CT)
Private Consultant (MA)
State Agency (NY)
Environmentalist (ME)
Private Consultant (MA)
Academic Institution (NH)
Public Interest Group (VT)
State Agency (MA)
Federal Agency (ID)
State Agency (NY)
Environmentalist (MA)
Citizen Activist (MA)
Citizen Activist (MA)
Private Firm (MA)
State Agency (NY)
LLW Generator (MA)
Private Firm (MA)
LLW Generator (MA)
State Agency (NH)
Federal Agency (MA)
Environmental Law Firm (MA)
LLW Generator (PA)
Legislative Commission (MA)
Game I
PMA
PMA
GW
Gov
EC
PMA
Council
Munis
EC
Council
ARG
ARG
GW
PMA
GW
Munis
GW
Munis
EC
EC
Gov
Council
Gov
Munis
ARG
EC
ARG
PMA
PMA
Gov
ARG
Council
Game II
ARG
Gov
Gov
Site A
Site C
ARG
Site C
Gov
EC
EC
Site A
Site C
Site C
ARG
Site C
EC
ARG
Site B
EC
Site B
Site A
Site B
Site A
Gov
Site B
ARG
Site A
EC
APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THIS STUDY
This appendix contains the questionnaire that was distributed
to the 34 participants at the DOE-sponsored Low-Level Waste
Facility Siting Workshop. Where appropriate, participants'
responses have been tallied and entered in the questionnaire.
Responses to the open-ended questions (Section V: Impressions)
are discussed in the body of the study.
LOW-LEVEL RADWASTE SIMULATION GANE
The purpose of this questionnaire is to find out your reactions
to the game on low-level radwaste management that you played at
MIT in December. The questionnaire is divided into 6 parts.
Please be sure to complete all 6 parts. This should take no
longer than 15 minutes.
I will call to record your responses to the questions. Your
responses will be kept strictly confidential. If you have any
concerns, please call me, Wendy Rundle, at 617/926-2736 or
leave a message at 617/253-2026. Thank you.
I. NEGOTIATION
The following statements relate to negotiation. Please indicate whether you agree
or disagree with each statement by checking the appropriate space.
STRONGLY SOPEvIHAT DON'T
AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE STRONGLY KNOW
AGREE DISAGREE
A. When I enter a negotiation I try to
take an opening position that is much
greater than what I know I will
settle for.
B. By acknowledging the legitimacy of my
adversary's concerns or problems, I
can usually help us both do better. 34 O
C. I will agree to discuss any set of
alternatives proposed by my adversary
even if I am not willing to commit 31
to them.
D. When I get my way it means that my
adversary has lost.
E. I usually find it advantageous to
complete one part of a negotiation
before going on to the next.
F. Once I get what I want, I am not
interested in helping my 30
adversary further.
G. If I am opposed to a proposal
suggested by my adversary, I
almost always reveal the true
reasons for my opposition.
II. RADWASTE SITING GAME
The following statements relate to the Radwaste Siting Game you played at MIT
in December. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement
by checking the appropriate space.
STRONGLY SOMEWHAT DON'T
AGREE SOMEWHAT DISAGREE STRONGLY KNOW
AGREE DISAGREE
A. The most successful players were
those who invented options that
the other players could accept. O
B. The players that had the greatest
impact on the agreement were
those who did the best job of
explaining their concerns.
C. The most successful players were
those who focused primarily on
their interests and not those :13
of other players.
D. The players most likely to get what
they wanted were those who never
deviated from the positions they
stated initially.
E. Prior negotiating experience was
the most important factor in
determining who got what they
wanted.
F. The most successful players were those
who consistently tried to accommodate :0
other players.
III. SMALL GROUP INTERACTIONS
The following questions concern the interactions within the small group of
which you were part, for Games One and Two. Game One involved criteria for
the screening of sites. Game Two involved the selection of an actual
community site.
A. Game One
1. Indicate the parties that dominated the negotiation session. Check no more than 3.
4 Governor's Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee
q Environmental Coalition
Public Management Authority
jj Association of Radwaste Generators
j* Green Wave
1O State Association of Municipal and County Governments
_ Federated Indian Tribal Council
2. Indicate the parties that had the least impact on the outcome. Check no more than 3.
JQ Governor's Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee
3 Environmental Coalition
5 Public Management Authority
A Association of Radwaste Generators
_ Green Wave
& State Association of Municipal and County Governments
J3 Federated Indian Tribal Council
3. Indicate any group player whose behavior was inconsistent with behavior you would
expect from a person in that role in real life.
-. Governor's Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee
4 Environmental Coalition
Public Management Authority
j0 Association of Radwadte Generators
(a Green Wave
Q State Association of Municipal and County Governments
1j Federated Indian Tribal Council
For any that you have checked, please explain:
4. Indicate any group player whose bdhavior was consistent with behavior you would
expect from a person in that role in real life.
2, Governor's Blue Ribbon Advisory Committee
Jj4- Environmental Coalition
_ A Public Management Authority
Jj Association of Radwaste Generators
14- Green Wave
_ State Association of Municipal and County Governments
'f Federated Indian Tribal Council
For any that you have checked, please explain:
A. Game One (continued)
5. Rank in order of importance the factors that best explain the outcome of your
group's negotiation. Please number the choices 1 through 6.
5 Parties were skillful and experienced negotiators
Design and structure of the game controlled the outcome
Personalities of the people involved in the game
-L The fact that it was a game and not a real negotiation
4 Ability to talk informally amongst parties
{o Other (please specify):
B. Game Two
1. Indicate the parties that dominated the negotiation session. Check no more than 3.
.4- Governor
j_ Environmental Coalition
1Q Association of Radwaste Generators
I1_ Town of Alford
4 Town of Bellman
5 Town of Crandon
2. Indicate the parties that had the least impact on the outcome. Check no more than 3.
'L. _Governor
' Environmental Coalition
7. Association of Radwaste GeneratorsQ Town of Alford
J Town of Bellman
{p Town of Crandon
3. Indicate any group player whose behavior was inconsistent with behavior you would
expect from a person in that role in real life.
Governor
Environmental Coalition
(o Association of Radwaste Generators
_ BTown of Alford
(o Town of Bellman
(a Town of Crandon
For any that you have checked, please explain:
4. Indicate any group player whose behavior was consistent with behavior you would
expect from a person in that role in real life.
9 Governor
(j Environmental Coalition
g Association of Radwaste Generators
13 Town of Alford
11 Town of Bellman
1_ Town of Crandon
For any that you have checked, please explain:
B. Game Two (continued)
5. Rank in order of importance the factors that best explain the outcome of your
group's negotiation. Please number the choices 1 through 6.
5 Parties were skillful and experienced negotiators
/ Design and structure of the game controlled the outcome
4- Personalities of the people involved in the game
4L The fact that it was a game and not a real negotiation
,3 Ability to talk informally amongst parties
tp Other (please specify):
IV. PARTICIPATION
The following questions seek to establish why you participated in the gaming sessions.
A. Indicate which of the following explains your interests in attending the gaming
sessions. Check all that apply.
_4- Learn about gaming
,;,. Learn how negotiation can be used to help solve disputes
;; Make professional contacts and meet others in the field
A Learn about low-level radwaste issues
.'.. Learn about the interests and opinions of others in the fieldJj Other (please specify):
B. Indicate which of the following reflects what you hoped to accomplish by playing.
Check all that apply.
_5 Behave like I would in a real negotiation and see the results
_L,_ Understand the interests and opinions of others, hear why they believe as they do
jj_ Test out different behaviors from those I would typically assume in a negotiation
23 Learn about negotiation
I Reach an agreement at any cost
.j Reach an agreement that I could support in real life
( Make a statement about my beliefs on the issues9 Other (please specify):
V. IMPRESSIONS
The following questions concern your overall impressions after playing the game.
A. If your group was one that did not reach agreement: What, if anything, might
have helped you reach agreement?
B. If your group was one that did reach agreement: What, if anything, maight have
helped you reach a more inclusive or otherwise better agreement?
C. After having played the game, do you think that your behavior in low-level radwaste
facility siting will change? If so, how? If not, Why?
VI. PERSONAL INFORMATION
The following questions provide information about the person responding to
this questionnaire.
A. Name:
B. Employment:
C. Involvement with low-level radwaste issues:
D. Education (please indicate subject and degree):
E. Prior to playing the game, had you been exposed to theories of principled negotiation
and simulation exercises such as these? yes, principled negotiation
I yes, simulation exercises
__ yes, both
.J8_ no, neither
F. Roles played: Game One
Game Two
